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Evaluating innovation policy: 
a structural treatment effect model of R&D subsidies 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 7/2008 
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This paper studies the welfare effects of R&D subsidies. We develop a model of 
continuous optimal treatment with outcome heterogeneity where the treatment 
outcome depends on applicant investment. The model takes into account 
heterogeneous application costs and identifies the treatment effect on the public 
agency running the programme. Under the assumption of a welfare-maximizing 
agency, we identify general equilibrium treatment effects. Applyiing our model to 
R&D project-level data we find substantial treatment effect heterogeneity. 
Agency-specific treatment effects are smaller than private treatment effects. We 
find that the rate of return on subsidies for the agency is 30–50%. 
 
Keywords: applications, effort, investment, R&D, selection, subsidies, treatment 
programme, treatment effects, welfare 
 
JEL classification numbers: O38, O31, L53, C31  
4 
Kansallisen innovaatiopolitiikan arviointi 
rakenteellisen mallin avulla 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 7/2008 
Tuomas Takalo – Tanja Tanayama – Otto Toivanen 




Tutkimus- ja kehitystoiminta (T&K) on keskeisin talouskasvuun vaikuttava seik-
ka, ja suorat T&K-tuet ovat erityisesti Suomessa tärkein politiikkainstrumentti, 
jolla T&K-toimintaan voidaan vaikuttaa. Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan suorien 
T&K-tukiaisten hyvinvointivaikutuksia Suomessa. Tutkimuksessa sovelletaan ra-
kenteellisia menetelmiä, joita on aiemmin käytetty lähinnä työmarkkinapolitiikan 
tutkimiseen. Työssä käytetyn mallin avulla voidaan yksilöidä T&K-tukien hyödyt 
sekä T&K-toimintaa harjoittaville yrityksille että tukia myöntävälle julkiselle 
organisaatiolle. Tässä tutkimuksessamme käytetään harvinaista ja yksityiskohtais-
ta T&K-projektitason aineistoa. Päätulos on, että julkisen organisaation tuotot 
T&K-tukiohjelmalle ovat 30–50 % mutta julkiset hyödyt T&K-tuista ovat selvästi 
pienemmät kuin yritysten saamat hyödyt. 
 
Avainsanat: talouskasvu, T&K-toiminta, innovaatiopolitiikka, T&K-tuet, raken-
teellinen mallinnus 
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Direct R&D subsidies are one of the most important innovation policy tools both 
in theory and in practice.
1 We model the functioning of an R&D subsidy program 
– the actions of firms applying for subsidies and of the agency deciding the 
subsidies. Taking our model to rarely available R&D project level data provides a 
welfare evaluation of the R&D subsidy program. 
  There is large literature on the determinants of R&D and the effects of R&D 
subsidies (Cohen, 1995, and David, Hall and Toole, 2000). While one of the main 
motivations of the latter literature is the welfare effect of R&D subsidies, the 
question has been addressed indirectly by studying the effects of subsidies on 
private R&D (referred to as additionality) or productivity. Recent examples of this 
line of work include Wallsten (2000) on the US SBIR program, Lach (2002) on 
Israel, Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) on Germany and Criscuolo, Martin, Overman 
and Van Reenen (2007) on UK. To directly study the level and distribution of 
welfare effects of an R&D subsidy program, we combine innovation policy 
analysis with methods from the treatment effects and structural industrial 
organization literatures. Our model generates an R&D equation that is fairly 
standard, except for a parameter restriction which we cannot reject. Further, we 
obtain an economic interpretation of the parameters and the error term in the R&D 
equation, and information on two hitherto unmeasured but important objects: 
agency specific treatment effects and application costs of firms. 
  Methodologically we build on the structural industrial organization (surveyed 
by Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes, 2006, and Reiss and Wolak, 2006) and 
treatment effects (eg Abbring and Heckman, 2006, and Heckman and Vytlacil, 
2006a,b) literatures. While structural methods have been extensively used in many 
areas of innovation research,
2 their applications to R&D subsidies have been 
limited, as pointed out by Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000). A notable exception 
is González, Jaumandreu, and Pazó (2005) who focus on the effectiveness of 
subsidies in stimulating private R&D. We complement their study by abstracting 
from set-up costs but emphasizing spillovers and treatment effects and by 
                                                 
1 R&D subsidies are promoted by theoretical research (eg Howitt, 1999, and Segerstrom, 2000) 
and they constitute the second largest and fastest growing form of industrial aid in developed 
countries (Nevo, 1998); the US has had several programs (Lerner, 1999) and currently spends $1.5 
billion a year on one R&D subsidy program alone (the SBIR; see 
http://www.sba.gov/sbir/indexwhatwedo.html, visited on January 21, 2004) and the EU exempts 
R&D subsidies from its state aid rules. In Finland where our data originates, R&D subsidies are 
the most important tool of innovation policy (Georghiu et al, 2003). 
2 See, eg Pakes (1986) on patent value, Levin and Reiss (1988) on cost-reducing and demand 
creating R&D, Lanjouw (1998) on patent value and litigation, Eaton and Kortum (2002) on the 
role of trade in diffusing the benefits of new technology, Jovanovic and Eeckhout (2002) on the 
impact of technological spillovers on the firm size distribution, and Petrin (2002) on the welfare 
effects of new products.  
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explicitly modelling the application process. There is also a close link from our 
paper to the methods used in research on firm-regulator interaction (eg Wolak, 
1994, and Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 2002). 
  Due to our institutional environment and data we need to modify the standard 
structural treatment effect model, first advocated by Heckman and Robb (1985) 
and Björklund and Moffitt (1987). The treatment effects literature focuses on 
voluntary social programs where participation is largely determined by self-
selection.
3 In R&D subsidy programs the behavior of the agency administering the 
program also affects participation substantially. Our set-up necessitates building, 
solving and estimating a game of incomplete information between a potential 
applicant and the agency. Our model generates a treatment outcome that is a 
function of the applicant’s investment, which in turn is a function of the received 
treatment. We consider a continuous, optimal treatment with ex ante treatment 
uncertainty, and outcome and application cost heterogeneity. What we ultimately 
obtain depends on what one is willing to assume about the objectives of the 
agency. At a minimum, we identify how the agents expect to benefit from a given 
treatment. If one assumes a benevolent social planner, we identify general 
equilibrium treatment effects. In this sense our approach of using the information 
in agency decisions complements existing work on estimating general equilibrium 
treatment effects (see Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998, Abbring and 
Heckman, 2006). 
  Our data contains R&D investment plans instead of outcomes. We are hence 
concerned with ex ante treatment effects and an ex ante policy evaluation in the 
sense that the R&D investments are yet be made. In other words, our calculations 
are informative of the decision makers’ preferences and the consequences of their 
decisions prior to uncertainty about project outcomes unfolding.
4 A policy should 
(at least) at this stage exhibit benefits that are larger than costs. 
  We have access to rich R&D project level data from Tekes (the National 
Technology Agency of Finland), the main source of R&D subsidies in Finland.
5 
Finland provides an interesting case because innovation policy has long been a 
central theme in government policy, the country has particularly rapidly 
transformed to a technology intensive economy (see eg Trajtenberg, 2001), and 
subsidies are the principal innovation policy tool.
6 The data contain all the subsidy 
applications with details of the planned R&D projects, the agency’s internal 
ratings of the applications and its decisions over a two- and half-year period (Jan. 
2000 – June 2002). The information on applications is matched to data on over 
                                                 
3 Heckman, Smith and Taber (1996) study the behavior of bureaucrats running a social program 
and Heckman and Smith (2004) the determinants of social program participation. 
4 McFadden (1975, 1976) is an early example of the revealed preference approach to public sector 
decision making. We embed that approach into a treatment model. 
5 Henderson and Cockburn (1996) is an important exception in the existing R&D literature in that 
they also use R&D project level data. 
6 For example, there are no R&D tax benefits.  
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14 000 Finnish firms that constitute a large proportion of potential applicants. To 
get acquainted with the actual decision making process, one of us spent eleven 
months in Tekes. Among other things she participated in the decision making 
meetings. 
  We report four main findings. First, the treatment effects on both the firms 
and the agency are very heterogenous. Second, application costs vary greatly and 
shocks to application costs and marginal profitability of R&D are positively 
correlated. That is, the better the project, the less likely a firm is to apply for a 
subsidy. This is intuitive once one observes that a major part of the application 
costs that we uncover comes from opportunity costs. Third, the agency specific 
treatment effects are smaller than private (firm) treatment effects. Fourth, we find 
that the rate of return on the subsidy program is of the order of 30–50%. In 
addition to the main findings, some of our parameter estimates are of independent 
interest, indicating eg economies of scale in externalities. 
  In Section 2 we first elaborate on the relationship between our model and a 
typical estimation equation exploring additionality on the one hand, and the 
standard treatment effect model on the other hand, and then present our model. 
We explain the institutional background and data in Section 3 and statistical 
assumptions, identification and estimation in Section 4. Econometric results are 
reported in Section 5. In Section 6 we present estimates of various treatment 
effects and our estimate of the agency’s return on the R&D subsidy program, 




2 The  model 
2.1 An  additionality  model 
The rich literature on the additionality of R&D subsidies provides a variety of 
ways to estimate the effects of subsidies on R&D investments. One variant can be 
written as 
 
i i i i ) s ( b X ) R ( f ε + κ + β =  (2.1) 
 
where  ) R ( f i  is a (eg log) transformation of the R&D investment Rt of firm i 
(gross or net of subsidies), Xi is a vector of firm characteristics and β the 
associated parameter vector, b(si) a transformation of the subsidy si,  κ the 
additionality parameter at the center of interest, and εi the error term. If b(si) is the 
monetary value of the subsidy and  ) R ( f i  the R&D investment, κ measures the  
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marginal effect of an extra subsidy dollar on private R&D. Data used to estimate 
(2.1) is typically at firm level, and R&D expenditures of firms with and without 
subsidies are observed. The econometric concern is that selection into the subsidy 
program is based also on εi, rendering b(si) endogenous. 
  In the literature (2.1) is interpreted as a behavioral equation. There is some 
flexibility in choosing the functions  ) R ( f i  and b(si), and a range of values for κ 
are possible. Values of κ≠1 are motivated by nonlinearities eg due to financial 
market imperfections or set-up costs. In our case, the R&D equation is a first-
order condition, which imposes a form on both  ) R ( f i  and b(si), and a value on κ. 
The main interest is in the other estimated parameters and their implications. The 
model underlying the first order condition suggests economic interpretations of 
the parameters and the error term, which generate our heterogenous private (firm) 
treatment effects. Since we only observe R&D plans for those firms that actually 
applied for subsidies, we encounter a selection problem. 
 
 
2.2  The standard selection model 
In terms of the treatment effect literature, our model is close to a generalized Roy 
model with essential heterogeneity (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006, and 
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2006a,b). There are two outcomes, with (subscript 1) and 
without treatment (subscript 0) 
 
) , X ( ), , X ( 0 i i 0 0 i 1 i i 1 1 i ε Π = Π ε Π = Π  (2.2a) 
 
where Xi and εil, l  ∈  {0,1}, are observable applicant characteristics and the 
outcome shocks. In addition, there is a selection equation 
 
() ( ) [] 0 , Y K E 1 d i i 0 i 1 i i ≥ ν − Π − Π =  (2.2b) 
 
where di is a binary treatment indicator (di  =  1 means treatment and di = 0 
otherwise). A potential applicant decides whether to take the treatment or not 
based on the expected gain. The gain consists of the difference between the 
expected difference in outcomes  () 0 i 1 i E Π − Π  and the application costs K(Yi, νi), 
which are affected both by observable applicant characteristics Yi and a shock νi. 
  Applicant investment and the agency running the treatment program are 
seldom explicitly modeled, but typically each applicant who is actually treated is 
assumed to get the same treatment. The model (2.2a,b) is taken to data on 
applicant (who often are individuals) characteristics and outcomes. Either  1 i Π  or 
0 i Π  is observed for each applicant i.  
11 
  In our case, (potential) applicants are firms who have ideas for R&D projects 
that require costly investments. The treatment is an R&D subsidy, reimbursing 
some fraction of R&D investment cost, ie the treatment is continuous rather than 
discrete. The treatment program is run by a public agency who screens and 
evaluates the project proposals and then decides how large a subsidy, if any, to 
give to each actual applicant. When the applicants decide whether or not to apply 
for a treatment, they encounter uncertainty about the exact level of treatment. 
Subsequently, all firms, irrespective of the application and treatment decisions, 
invest in R&D effort in their project to maximize their expected discounted 
profits. 
  In many environments, functions  () il i l , X ε Π  and outcome shocks εil may be 
choice specific (ie  () () 0 1 Π ≠ Π  and  0 i 1 i ε ≠ ε ), since the treatment may lead to eg 
a change in profession. However, in our case the actual treatment affects marginal 
cost of investment rather than the outcome of the investment directly, while the 
expected effects of the treatment affect the application decision. Hence, assuming 




2.3  A model with endogenous continuous treatment and 
investment 
We model the subsidy program as a four-stage game of incomplete information 
between a firm with an R&D project and the agency. In stage zero, the players’ 




A , , t ℜ ∈ ω ω η = , drawn from a common knowledge joint distribution. Each 
firm is endowed with one R&D project which has a two-dimensional type, 
2
0
F ) , ( t ℜ ∈ ν ε = , drawn from a common knowledge bivariate distribution. Given 
our assumption of one project per firm, we talk interchangeably of ‘firm’ and 
‘project’ type in what follows. Conditional on publicly observed information the 
shocks are independently distributed. The type of a player contributes to the 
player’s valuation of a project. In stage one, the firm decides whether or not to 
apply for the subsidy program. The application includes a proposal for an R&D 
project. In stage two, the agency whose objective function is assumed to include 
the firm’s profits as an argument screens and evaluates the proposed project. It 
then decides the level of subsidy, s, s∈[0,s] and s≤1, which is the share of the 
                                                 
7 The treatment model we develop could also be applied (with proper modifications) to some other 
treatment programs than R&D subsidies where similar institutional details are relevant. For 
example, our set-up is close to what Jaffe (2002) calls a ‘canonical’ research grant program and the 
one in Roberts, Maddala and Enholm (1978) who study what determines whether a regulated firm 
requests a review of its regulated rate of return.  
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investment cost covered by the agency. In stage three, the firm makes the R&D 
investment, R,  ) , 0 [ R ∞ ∈ , with or without the subsidy. 
  Our model builds on the following key assumptions: 
 
A.1   The potential applicant is uncertain about the agency’s valuation of the 
applicant’s project. 
A.2   A subsidy cannot be misused. 
A.3   There are no constraints on the firm’s investment. 
A.4   The agency’s budget constraint does not bind. 
A.5   The firm’s investment is non-contractible. 
 
A.1 ensures – in line with our data – equilibrium outcomes where a firm applies 
for a subsidy only to be turned down. It accommodates various informational 
assumptions concerning the players’ types. Due to our functional form 
assumptions (see equations (2.3) and (2.8) below), the firm can neither signal its 
type nor does the agency care about it. We only need to assume that the firm, 
when contemplating application, does not exactly know how the agency values 
the proposed project. For clarity, we assume that the firm’s type is common 
knowledge and that the agency learns its type exactly after screening.
8 
  A.2 excludes moral hazard problems in the use of a treatment.
9 By A.3, the 
solution to the applicant’s maximization problem in the last stage is interior which 
greatly facilitates the estimation of our model. This assumption rules out credit 
rationing and other discontinuities that have been emphasized in the innovation 
policy literature. For example, A.3 amounts to assuming that firms have already 
made the fixed (R&D) investments. One can defend the assumption of no fixed 
costs on the grounds that the applicants are existing firms who submit plans for a 
                                                 
8 That is, symmetric but incomplete information regarding the agency’s type prevails in the 
application stage. Alternatively, we could assume that the applicant has private information about 
the agency's utility from its project and that the agency receives a noisy signal upon it after 
screening the project. Since the applicant could not credibly signal its private information in our 
model, this assumption would yield the same optimal application and subsidy decisions as the 
(more realistic) assumption we use. In an earlier version (HECER DP no. 76/2005) we develop a 
treatment program model with general functional forms. There we need to assume that the firm’s 
type is common knowledge to rule out signalling. 
9 In practice, moral hazard temptations are certainly possible with monetary treatments. As a 
result, Tekes has several safe-guards against expropriation. For example, subsidies are only paid 
against receipts, there is a euro limit to a subsidy, and a significant number of subsidized R&D 
projects is annually randomly audited. Because the safe-guards are common knowledge, and the 




10 A.4 is also motivated by simplicity, but we do impose a cost of 
financing on the agency. A.5 is more realistic, since it prevents the firm and the 
agency from writing a binding contract specifying the amount the firm invests 
conditional on the subsidy. 
  We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria where, in stage one, a potential 
applicant correctly anticipates the type-contingent strategies of the agency in stage 
two, and where the firm’s and agency’s strategies are sequentially rational. In this 
extensive form game the firm’s posterior belief concerning the agency’s type after 
receiving a subsidy is inconsequential, so we start from the firm’s maximization 
problem in stage three. 
 
 
2.3.1  Objective function of the firm and stage three of the game 
We specify firm i’s objective function as 
 
i i i i i i i i i i R ) s 1 ( R ln ) X exp( ) , X , s , R ( − − ε + β + π = ε Π  (2.3) 
 
where si is the subsidy, Ri the R&D investment, Xi a vector of observable firm 
characteristics, and β a vector of parameters to be estimated. The marginal 
profitability is affected by a random shock, εi, (ie, by firm i’s type), uncorrelated 
with the observable firm characteristics, observed by the firm, and unobserved by 
the econometrician. It may or may not be observable to the agency. The 
reservation value including other projects is embodied in πi.
11  () Π  measures the 
expected discounted profits, conditional on subsidy si. 
  In stage three, the firm chooses its investment Ri to maximize (2.3). Since the 









=  (2.4) 
 
                                                 
10 While we make A.3 for simplicity, we note that the revealed motivations for R&D subsidies 
have increasingly been based on spillovers rather than financial market failures. A study using 
Finnish data (Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2003), and an evaluation of Finnish innovation policy 
(Georghiu et al, 2003) conclude that only small, R&D intensive, growth-oriented firms may face 
financial constraints. The situation is similar in many other industrialized countries, as the survey 
by Hall (2002) confirms. The decline of the financial constraint motivation for R&D subsidies is 
also reflected in our application: although Tekes also grants low-interest loans, most firms were 
not interested in them. 
11 We could also generalize (2.3) to multiple projects. For each firm with multiple project 
applications, we could treat each project as a separate observation. If the project-specific 
unobservables are uncorrelated, this will not materially affect estimation. The interpretation for 
non-applicants would be that none of their projects resulted in an application.  
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gives the firm’s optimal investment Ri(si). Equations (2.3) and (2.4) show the 
economic interpretation of εi: a positive shock to the marginal profitability leads 
to a larger investment. An optimal investment given by (2.4) could in theory 
decrease profits but, in such a case, the firm would not invest at all, and 
consequently would not apply for a subsidy. 
  Equation (2.3) is our equivalent of the outcome equation (2.2a) in the 
generalized Roy model with the exception that in our case Π refers to expected 
discounted profits. Equation (2.4) in turn will produce our R&D investment 
equation that is close to the additionality equation (2.1). Since we abstract from 
fixed costs of starting an R&D project, and assume that a subsidy has no impact 
on the idea behind the project, the treatment in our model only affects the 
intensive margin without nonlinear effects. To allow a nonlinear effect of the 
subsidy we could, for example, write the last part of (2.3) as  i i R ) s 1 (
κ −  where κ 
would measure additionality. We prefer our formulation for three reasons. First, 
the formulation  i i R ) s 1 (
κ − , while useful, is ad hoc.
12 Second, the interpretation of 
κ would be ambiguous. Using a Box-Cox transformation to model returns to R&D 
in (2.3) would yield the same estimation equation as the assumptions of 
logarithmic returns in R&D and  i i R ) s 1 (
κ − . Third, we cannot reject the Null that 
1 = κ . 
 
 
2.3.2  Agency utility and stage two of the game 
The agency’s expected utility from applicant i’s project is given by 
 
()
i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
F ) s ( R gs ) , s ), s ( R , X ( )) s ( R , , Z ( V
) , , Z , X , s , s R ( U




where Fi captures the fixed costs of applying and processing the application and g 
is the constant opportunity cost of the agency’s resources, eg the opportunity cost 
of tax funds. The firm’s utility enters directly and additively the agency’s utility 
function. 
  The interpretation of V( ) is fundamental to our analysis. V( ) captures the 
expected effects of the firm’s project on the agency beyond the firm’s utility and 
the direct costs of the subsidy and the application process. V(  ) can include 
externalities from a firm’s R&D such as consumer surplus or spillovers to other 
firms. It could also contain idiosyncratic benefits to the decision maker, through 
eg bribes or a revolving door mechanism. This agency specific utility can also be 
decreasing in R&D through negative externalities. 
                                                 
12 Theoretically more justified ways to introduce non-linear effects of subsidies, eg via fixed start-
up costs at the project level, would greatly complicate the estimation of the model.  
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  ηi in V( ) constitutes part of the agency’s type, and it is defined as a random 
shock to the agency specific utility from project i. It is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with firm characteristics, and unobserved by the econometrician. By A.1, ηi is 
also unobserved by the potential applicant and observed by the agency (at the 
latest) after application and screening takes place. In other words, the potential 
applicant is uncertain about how the agency, after screening the project proposal, 
sees the project and its potential to generate spillovers, consumer surplus, or 
private benefits to the agency’s civil servants. 
  The agency specific utility V( ) also includes Zi, a vector of observable firm 
characteristics, which contains the same elements as Xi. In our case, Zi also 
includes two screening outcomes that are partly determined by ωic and ωim, which 
are part of the agency’s type. After having received a proposal the agency grades 
its quality in two dimensions. ωic and ωim are defined as random shocks to the 
screening outcome (=  grade) of project i in grading dimension c and m 
respectively (where c and m stand for technical challenge and market risk as will 
be explained in Section 3). The screening outcomes are two grades on a Likert 
scale of 5 observed by the agency and by the econometrician but not by the firm. 
We assume that the grading process and its parameters (excluding the ω’s) are 
common knowledge. That is, conditional on observables, the firm correctly 
assesses the probability of getting a particular grade in each of the two grading 
dimensions. 
  In stage two, the agency chooses a subsidy level si,  ] s , 0 [ s∈  where  1 s ≤ , to 
maximize (2.5), taking (2.4) into account. To arrive at an estimable model we 
need to specify the effect of Ri on V( ). We assume that 
 
i i i Z R / V η + δ = ∂ ∂  (2.6) 
 
where δ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. An implication of (2.6) is that 
V( ) is proportional to R&D investment. Similar assumptions are common in the 
literature on growth and R&D spillovers. We test this assumption below and do 
not reject it. 
  Using the envelope theorem, (2.3), (2.4) and (2.6), the first-order condition for 
the agency’s unconstrained problem can be written as 
 
i i i Z g 1 s η + δ + − =  (2.7) 
 
We verify later that (2.7) characterizes the maximum. Equation (2.7) shows how 
the agency’s unconstrained decision rule is decreasing in the shadow cost of 
public funds, g. It is independent of the firm’s type,  ) , ( t 0
F ν ε = , so even if the 
agency did not know the private shock to the marginal profitability of R&D, it 
would not matter. The optimal subsidy depends positively on the shock to the  
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agency specific utility, ηi. The minimum constraint of s  =  0 binds for 
δ − − ≡ η ≤ η i i i Z 1 g  and the maximum constraint of s for 
δ − − + ≡ η ≥ η i i i Z 1 g s.  
 
 
2.3.3  The firm’s beliefs and application costs, and the stage one of 
the game 
In stage one, a profit maximizing firm applies for a subsidy if the expected utility 
from applying is at least as large as that from not applying. To calculate the 
expected profit increase from applying, the firm needs to calculate expected 
profits from submitting an application based on its beliefs about the agency’s 
valuation of its application. As mentioned, the agency’s valuation of the project i 
depends on its type  () im ic i
A
i , , t ω ω η = , which is unknown to the firm prior to the 
application. Let  ) ( i η φ  define firm i’s belief about ηi and let  ) ( i η Φ  be the 
corresponding cumulative distribution function. Moreover, let  () ic ich p ω  and 
() im imh p ω  denote the firm’s beliefs (= probability) that its project i gets grade 
h∈{1,…,5} in grading dimensions c and m respectively. 
  The firm weights the expected profit increase from applying against its costs. 
We specify the costs of application as 
 
) Y exp( K i i i ν + θ =  (2.8) 
 
where Yi is a vector of observable firm characteristics, θ is a vector of parameters 
to be estimated and νi is a random cost shock, distributed by nature, uncorrelated 
with observable firm characteristics, observed by the firm, and unobserved by the 
econometrician and the agency (again, the latter is immaterial). 
  Dropping the subscript i we can now write the applicant’s decision rule as 
 
} 0 K ) 0 ), 0 ( R ( )} s ), s ( R ( )] ( 1 [











η η φ η η Π + Π η Φ ω ω = ∫ ∑∑
η
η ==  (2.9) 
 
where di is an indicator function that takes the value one if firm i finds it profitable 
to apply for a subsidy and is zero otherwise. Clearly, the application rule (2.9) 
corresponds to the selection equation of the generalized Roy model (2.2b): there is 
sorting on the gain. In (2.9) the summation is over the potential screening 
outcomes. The first term in the curly brackets is the expected profit in case the 
application is rejected. The rejection occurs when  i i η ≤ η , ie with probability  
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) Z 1 g ( i i δ − − ≡ η Φ . The second term is the expected profit when  ) , ( i i i η η ∈ η  in 
which case the firm receives the optimal interior subsidy given by (2.7). The third 
term is the probability of receiving a maximal subsidy multiplied by the profits 
with the maximal subsidy. This case occurs with probability 
) Z 1 g s ( 1 i i δ − − + ≡ η Φ − . The two last terms capture the costs of applying. 
Besides the fixed application costs Ki, the firm takes into account that it can 
execute the project without a subsidy (as implied by A.3), in which case the 




We complete the model by showing that there is a unique Perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, ensuring a meaningful econometric implementation of the model. 
Perfect Baysian equilibria in our model consist of four components: 1) A firm’s 
decision whether to apply for a subsidy or not, di∈{0,1}; 2)  the firm’s belief 
functions pijh(ωij), h∈{1,…,5}, j∈{c, m},  and  φ(ηi) that describe a (common) 
assessment of how the agency values the firm’s project; 3) the agency’s subsidy 
decision rule  i
*
i i d s s =  which determines the level of subsidy granted to firm i 
given di; and 4) the firm’s investment rule  ) s ( R i
*
i  given si and di. 
 
PROPOSITION. There is a unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium where di is given 
by (2.9), 
*
i s  is zero for  i i η ≤ η , is given by (2.7) for  ) , ( i i i η η ∈ η  and is s f o r 
i i η ≥ η , and  ) s ( R i
*
i  is given by (2.4). 
 
Proof: For brevity of notation, we drop the subscript i. In stage three, the firm has 
a well-defined best-reply function R*(s) given by (2.4). In stage two, the agency 
maximizes its expected utility conditional on its type  () m c
A , , t ω ω η =  and 
receiving an application (d = 1).  There  is  a  unique type-contingent optimal 
subsidy s*, if the second order condition for the agency’s decision problem holds. 
Since we have linear constrains of minimum and maximum subsidies, it suffices 
to show that U(R*(s),s) is concave when evaluated at the interior solution given 
by (2.7). Differentiating (2.5) twice using the fact that  0 R / = ∂ Π ∂  shows that 




















































Since from (2.3) and (2.6) we see that 
2 2 s /∂ Π ∂  and 
2 2 R / V ∂ ∂  are zero, (2.10) 


























. Using (2.3), (2.4) and (2.6) 
we get  ()
()















g 2 1 <
−
− η + δ
+ − . Evaluating this inequality at the interior solution 
given by (2.7) yields –1 < 0. Consequently, there is a unique maximum that solves 
the agency’s decision problem. Because the optimal unconstrained subsidy (2.7) is 
increasing in η, s* = 0 for  η ≤ η , s* is given by (2.7) for  ) , ( η η ∈ η  and  s * s =  for 
η ≥ η , and this s* determines s given d = 1. If the agency does not receive an 
application (d = 0), s = 0 irrespective of the agency’s type. Thus, conditional on d, 
the type-contingent action of the agency in stage two is unique. In stage one the 
firm decides whether to apply or not given s* and pjh(ωj) and φ(η). Since in a 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the firm’s choice must maximize the profits and the 
firm’s beliefs must be consistent with the agency’s strategy, d = 1 only if (2.9) 
holds and d = 0 otherwise. Clearly, the agency’s best response to d = 1 is s = s* so 
we have found a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Since the utility maximizing action 
in each stage of the game is unique, the equilibrium is also unique.■ 
 
 
2.4 Treatment  effects 
In the language of the treatment effects literature, we concentrate on internal 
validity (eg Heckman and Vytlacil (2006a), ie, the effects of actual interventions 
on outcomes, and we estimate ex ante treatment effects (eg Abbring and 
Heckman, 2006). The traditionally measured treatment effect on the treated (for a 
given si) is given by  ) s 1 ln( ) X exp( ) 0 , R ( ) s , R ( i i i i i i − ε + β − = Π − Π . We label this 
the ‘gross private treatment effect’. This depends on firm-specific observables and 
unobservables and is by construction heterogenous. We measure the ‘net private 
treatment’ effect by subtracting the heterogenous costs of application Ki. 
  In our model a subsidy has a separate effect on the agency. We name the 
subsidy-induced change in the agency specific utility V( ) ‘the agency treatment 
effect’. The (ex ante) gross agency treatment effect conditional on si is 
[]
i
i i i i i
i i i i s 1
s ) X exp( ) Z (
) 0 ( R ) s ( R V
−
ε + β η + δ
− = − .
13 The joint treatment effect is 
defined as the sum of private and agency treatment effects. 
  We identify the private and agency treatment effects irrespective of the 
interpretation of V( ). If one furthermore assumes that the agency is a benevolent 
                                                 
13 The fixed cost of screening applications is ignored (ie we assume that Fi = Ki).  
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social planner, V(  ) will capture all general equilibrium effects of a treatment 
outside those appropriated by the applicant and the joint treatment effect is the 
general equilibrium treatment effect. In this sense our approach of using the 
information in agency decisions complements existing work on estimating general 
equilibrium treatment effects (see Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998, Abbring 
and Heckman, 2006). To assess the expected welfare effects of the program one 
can then compare the estimated rate of return on subsides to the opportunity cost 
of public funds. 
 
 
3  Finnish innovation policy, Tekes and data
14 
3.1  Innovation policy and Tekes’ subsidy program 
In 2001 Finland invested 3.6 per cent of GDP – 5 billion€ – on R&D. Tekes is the 
principal public financier of private R&D in Finland.
15 The primary objective of 
Tekes is to promote the competitiveness of Finnish industry and the service sector 
by providing funding and advice to both business and public R&D. To this end 
Tekes strives to increase Finnish firms’ R&D and risk-taking. Tekes is also 
responsible for allocating funding from European Regional Development Funds 
(ERDF), which is meant for the less-favored regions. Finnish regions are 
heterogenous: eg some 20% of the population lives in the capital region in 
Southern Finland, where also a large part of the economic activity and most of 
R&D takes place. 
  Besides funding business R&D, Tekes finances feasibility studies, and R&D 
by public sector including scientific research. In 2001 Tekes funding amounted to 
387 million€, and it received 2948 applications of which almost exactly 2/3 were 
accepted. The number of applications by the business sector for R&D funding was 
1357 and, again, 2/3 of them were accepted. In monetary terms, the business 
sector applied for 526 million€ while 211 million€ were granted to it. 
  Business R&D funding consists of grants, low-interest loans and capital loans. 
Tekes’ low-interest loans not only have an interest rate below the market rate but 
they are also soft. If the project turns out to be a commercial failure, the loan may 
                                                 
14 As our application data is from Jan. 2000 – June 2002, we use 2001 figures to describe the 
environment. Public information about Tekes can be found at http://www.tekes.fi/eng/, accessed 
December 20th, 2004. Public information is supplemented by knowledge we acquired when one of 
us spent nine months in Tekes to participate in the actual decision making process. 
15 Main public funding organizations in the Finnish innovation system in addition to Tekes are the 
Academy of Finland, Employment and Economic Development Centers (T&E Centers), Finnvera,  
Industry Investment and Sitra. Also the Foundation of Finnish Inventions (Innofin) provides 
financial support for innovation. See Georghiu et al (2003) for a description of the Finnish 
innovation policy institutions.  
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not have to be paid back. A capital loan granted by Tekes differs from the 
standard private sector debt contract in various ways: it is included in fixed assets 
in the balance sheet, it can be paid off only when unrestricted shareholders’ equity 
is positive and the debtor cannot give collateral for the loan. The share of each 
instrument of the total funding allocated to business R&D in 2001 was 69%, 18% 
and 13%. Subsidy applications covered 83% of the amount applied whereas in 
terms of granted amount subsidies’ share was 67%. The overlook of loans by 
applicants suggests that they may not encounter significant financial constrains, 
supporting our assumption A.4 (cf. footnote 10). 
  The application process from the submission to the final decision, which to 
our understanding is well known among potential applicants, proceeds along the 
lines of the theory model of Section 2. In practice, Tekes screens the application 
and grades it in several dimensions, not two, as we assume for simplicity. The two 
dimensions concerning the technological challenge of the project and its market 
risk that we use are, however, in practice the most important ones.
16 Tekes’ public 
decision criteria are: the project’s effect on the competitiveness of the applicant, 
the technology to be developed, the resources reserved for the project, the 
collaboration with other firms within the project, societal benefits, and the effect 
of Tekes’ funding. Tekes takes into account whether the application comes from 
an SME and, as mentioned above, the funding also has a regional dimension 
through ERDF. Putting the regional aspect aside, the funding from ERDF is 
subject to the same general criteria as other Tekes’ funding. 
  An application has to include the purpose and the budget of the R&D project 
for which Tekes funding is needed, and the applied amount of funding in euros. 
Tekes’ final decision is based on the proposed budget of the project before the 
R&D investments are made and a subsidy is granted as a share of to-be-incurred 
R&D costs.
17 Decision making is constrained by the rules preventing negative 
subsidies and very large subsidies both in relative and absolute terms. If the firm 
fulfils the EU SME criterion, the upper bound for the share of covered R&D costs 
is 0.6, otherwise 0.5. We use this variation in identification, imposing the 
exclusion restriction that the SME status has an effect only on Tekes’ decision and 
application costs of the firms. This exclusion restriction comes from the 
                                                 
16 A loose translation of grades of technological challenge is 0 = ‘no technical challenge’, 1 = 
‘technological novelty only for the applicant’, 2 = ‘technological novelty for the network or the 
region’, 3 = ‘national state-of-the-art’, 4 = ‘demanding international level’, and 5 = ‘international 
state-of-the-art’. For market risk, it is 0 = ‘no identifiable risk’, 1 = ‘small risk’, 2 = ‘considerable 
risk’, 3 = ‘big risk’, 4 = ‘very big risk’, and 5 = ‘unbearable risk’. Since only five grades are used 
in practice, we, too, use a 5-grade Likert scale. 
17 Tekes sometimes adjusts a proposed budget downwards when an applicant, eg applies subsidies 
for costs that Tekes cannot cover. An upward adjustment is also possible in principle but rare in 
practice, occurring virtually only if a project significantly changes character during the application 
process. Such upgrades can thus be taken as exogenous events that cannot be manipulated by 
Tekes to overcome the institutional limits on its subsidy allocation.  
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institutional environment and could also be used in an analysis of additionality.
18 
Actual funding is only given after the R&D investments are made, covering the 
promised share of incurred costs up to a specified euro limit. The limit should 
allow the promised reimbursement of investment costs up to the profit 
maximizing level but prevent Tekes from covering costs extraneous to the project 
proposal.
19 In terms of our model, the rules governing feasible subsidies amount 




Our data come from two sources. The project level data come from Tekes, 
containing all applications to Tekes from January 1st 2000 to June 30th 2002. 
They consist of detailed information on the project proposals and Tekes’ 
decisions. The firm level data covering originally 14 657 Finnish firms come from 
Asiakastieto Ltd, which is a for-profit company collecting, standardizing, and 
selling firm specific quantitative information.
20 Asiakastieto’s data are based on 
public registers and on information collected by Asiakastieto itself. The data 
contain for example, firms’ official profit sheet and balance sheet statements, and 
include all the firms who file their data in the public register or submit the 
information to Asiakastieto. We use the 1999 cross section, ie all firm 
characteristics are recorded earlier than the application data. The sample was 
drawn from Asiakastieto’s registers in 2002 according to three criteria: i) the most 
recent financial statement of the firm in the register is either from 2000 or 2001; 
ii) the firm is a corporation; and iii) the industrial classification of the firm is 
manufacturing, ICT, research and development, architectural and engineering and 
related technical consultancy, or technical testing and analysis. Firms in these 
industries are the most likely to apply for funding from Tekes. After cleaning the 
                                                 
18 Given our data, it is unlikely that firms deliberately keep themselves below the EU SME 
boundary requiring that a firm has less than 250 employees and has either sales less than 40 
million euros or the balance sheet less than 27 million euros. Most of the firms in our data are well 
below the boundary, as 95% them have less than 110 employees, less than 14 million euros in 
sales, and a balance sheet of less than 11 million. As the SME criterion also maintains that large 
firms can hold at most 25% of a SME’s equity and votes, it is unlikely that many of the SMEs are 
subsidiaries of large firms. We thus consider the SME status of a firm exogenous. 
19 As mentioned in footnote 9, the euro limit alleviates the moral hazard problem. There are also 
other reasons for the limit. Because Tekes has an annual operating budget, a practical decision rule 
is to cap the euro amount using the proposed budget, as it is the best available information at the 
time the subsidy decision is made. Tekes is also monitored both by the press and politicians. Tekes 
civil servants may want avoid the accusations of granting larger subsidies than originally planned. 
At the same time, however, there may be a desire to make the limit high enough to allow profit 
maximizing behavior of applicants. 
20 More information about Asiakastieto can be found at http://www.asiakastieto.fi/en/, accessed 
June 20th, 2005.  
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data of firms with missing values, we are left with 10 944 firms. These firms 
constitute our sample of potential applicants. 
  The firms in our sample account for roughly half of all applications. There are 
three principal reasons for the exclusion of an applicant from our sample: 1) the 
firm did not exist in 1999; 2) the firm did not operate in the industries from which 
the sample was formed; and 3) the firm was so small that it was not obliged by 
law to send its balance and profit sheets to the official registry. 
  The data we use in the estimations comprises 915 applications, where we use 
the first application in case a firm had multiple applications within our 
observation period. 722 of these applications were accepted, ie received a positive 
subsidy share. Table 3.1 displays summary statistics of our explanatory variables 
for potential applicants, and Table 3.2 conditions the statistics on the application 
decision and success. As Table 3.1 shows, potential applicants are heterogenous. 
They are on average 12 years old with 35 employees. A very high proportion of 
firms are SMEs according to the official EU standard (cf. footnote 18). Sales per 
employee, a measure of value added, is 165 000€. Some 22% are exporters. 
 
Table 3.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean  S.d.  Min.  Max. 
Age, years  12  9.3  1  97 
# Employees  35  257  1  13451 
Sales/employee, 1000€  165  2157  0  206875.5 
Exporter 0.22  0.42  0  1 
SME 0.98  0.16  0  1 
CEO is chairman of board  0.14  0.35  0  1 
Board size  4.35  2.00  1  10 
# past Tekes applications  0.58  3.49  0  146 
Applicant 0.08  0.28  0  1 
Notes: There are 10945 observations. 
Data sources: Asiakastieto LTd. Otherwise; for data on applications, Tekes. 
 
 
We also have information on two corporate governance variables. In some 14% of 
potential applicants, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Such an 
arrangement can, on the one hand, improve the information flow between the 
board and the executive but, on the other hand, weakens the board’s 
independence. The board of an average potential applicant has four to five 
members. A larger board is costlier but is more likely to include members with 
outside knowledge that may be useful either in conducting R&D (eg choosing 
among competing projects, organizing management of current projects, 
monitoring), or in the application process itself. 
  From Table 3.2 we see that applicants are larger than non-applicants and 
successful applicants larger than rejected ones. The median number of employees 
for non-applicants is 5, for applicants 26, and for rejected applicants 21. The  
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applicants also tend to have larger boards. Quite naturally, applicants have more 
previous applications on average than non-applicants. The difference in both 
means and medians is 4. 
  Table 3.3 reports information about applications and Tekes’ decisions (see 
Appendix A2 for more details). Some 21% of applications are rejected. The 
proposed projects involve on average an investment of 630  000€, the rejected 
proposals being smaller with a mean of 386 000€. According to Tekes’ rating, the 
projects have on average a technical challenge of 2 (scale 0–5), and rejected 
proposals have on average a lower score of 1.5. The mean risk score is also 2, but 
it is the same for successful and rejected applications. 
 








Age  12 12 12  12 
 (9)  (10)  (10)  (9) 
 [10]  [10]  [9]  [10] 
# Employees  21  189  101  212 
  (122) (776) (188)  (867) 
 [5]  [26]  [21]  [27] 
Sales/employee  169 122 105  126 
 (2253)  (55)  (94)  (167) 
 [76]  [90]  [83]  [92] 
Exporter  0.19 0.57 0.52  0.59 
  (0.39) (0.50) (0.50)  (0.49) 
SME  0.99 0.85 0.86  0.85 
  (0.12) (0.36) (0.35)  (0.36) 
CEO is chairman of board  0.14  0.15  0.18  0.14 
  (0.35) (0.36) (0.38)  (0.35) 
Board  size  4.2 6.2 5.9  6.3 
  (1.9) (2.4) (2.3)  (2.5) 
  [4] [6] [5]  [6] 
# past Tekes applications  0.25  4.16  3.23  4.41 
 (1.28)  (10.66)  (10.93)  (10.58) 
  [0] [2] [1]  [2] 
Nobs. 10030  915  193  722 
Notes: Number reported are mean, (standard deviation), and for other than [0,1] variables, 
[median]. 
Data sources: Asiakastieto Ltd. Otherwise; for data on applications, Tekes. 
 
 
As explained, Tekes grants low-interest and capital loans besides subsidies. 
Because it is hard to calculate the value of such non-standard loans to the 
applicants, we pool the instruments. We thus define the subsidy per cent as the 
sum of all three forms of financing, divided by ‘accepted proposed’ investment.
21 
                                                 
21 As mentioned in footnote 17, Tekes sometimes adjusts a proposed budget, eg when an applicant 
applies for subsidies for costs that Tekes cannot cover. We use the unadjusted number (‘proposed 
investment’) in our estimations.  
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As some 60% of applicants only apply for a subsidy, and over 80% are only 
granted a subsidy, this seems a reasonable simplification. Measuring a subsidy in 
this way, 0.4% of applicants get the maximum subsidy.
22 Successful applicants 
receive on average a subsidy that covers 32% of the R&D investment costs. We 
test the robustness of our results to the definition of a subsidy by using only pure 
subsidies. 
 
Table 3.3  Descriptive statistics of Tekes and application 
     variables 
 




Applied amount, €  634294  700378  385790 
 (1254977)  (1363460)  (657540) 
Applied for subsidy only  0.59  0.48  1.00 
 (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.00) 
Technical challenge  2.1  2.3  1.5 
 (0.98)  (0.87)  (1.00) 
 {582}  {426}  {156} 
Risk 2.2  2.2  2.3 
 (0.94)  (0.93)  (0.94) 
 {422}  {326}  {96} 
Granted subsidy rate  –  0.32  – 
   (0.13)   
Granted subsidy only  –  0.84  – 
   (0.60)   
Nobs. 915  722  193 
Notes: Datasource: Tekes. Reported numbers are mean, standard deviation, and {nobs}, 
the last in case it deviates from that reported on the last row. 
 
 
4  The econometric model 
4.1 The  model 
We now operationalize the model presented in Section 2. We assume that the 
agency gives each application i a grade h∈{1,…,5} in dimension j∈{c, m} by 
using a latent regression framework. Denoting the latent value of grading 
dimension j∈{c, m} for application i by 
*
ij w  and the observed value by wij, we get 
 
                                                 
22 There is a cluster of firms right below the maximum subsidy: 1.9% of applicants get a subsidy 
which is less than one percentage point below the maximum subsidy, and 2.5% get a subsidy less 
than 5 percentage points below the maximum. At the lower end there is no such clustering: on the 
contrary, no firm gets a subsidy that is less than 2.9%: however, 2.6% of applicants get a subsidy 
that is greater than 2.9% and less than 5%.  
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= ω ω ∈ ω
∞ → μ = μ = μ −∞ → μ =
μ ≤ ω + ζ = < μ = −
 (4.1) 
 
where Ti is a vector of observable firm characteristics and ζj is a parameter vector 
to be estimated. The unobservables ωij, which are part of the agency’s type, are 
assumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated both with each other and 
other unobservables of the model. We further assume that firms know this grading 
process and its parameters (excluding the ωij), using (4.1) to generate the 
probabilities pijh(ωij) of getting grade h in dimension j. 
  By substituting (2.4) for Ri in (2.3) and using the resulting expression in (2.9) 
the application decision rule (2.9) can be simplified to 
 
{} 0 ] K )) s 1 (ln( E )[ X exp( 1 d i i i i i ≥ − − − ε + β =  (4.2) 
 
Using (2.8), and taking logarithms on both sides, the application rule can be 
derived from (4.2) as 
 
[] {} i i i i i i )) s 1 (ln( E ln Y X 1 d ε − ν ≥ − − + θ − β =  (4.3) 
 
The investment equation can be rewritten, upon taking logarithms of (2.4), as 
 
i i i i
*




i i i R ln d R ln = . As it stands, (4.4) is close to the prototypical 
additionality equation of Section 2.1. In our model,  ) s ( R ln ) R ( f i
*
i i = , 
) s 1 ln( ) s ( b i i − − =  (as in González, Jaumandreu, and Pazó, 2005), and  1 = κ . The 
traditional approach would concentrate on estimating and interpreting κ, and 
would interpret (4.4) as a behavioral rule. Here we test and do not reject the 
restriction that  1 = κ , which arises from the underlying economic model. Another 
difference to earlier work is that in our model (4.4) is a first order condition. We 
can hence use equation (4.4) to estimate the parameters of the underlying profit 
function to calculate treatment effects on expected discounted profits We could 
calculate the treatment effects for arbitrary values of κ. 
  The agency decision rule is 
 
i i i Z g 1 s η + δ + − =
∗  (4.5) 
 
with observations  i i i d s s
∗ =  for  ) s , 0 ( s
*
i ∈ ,  i i d s s =  if  s s
*
i ≥  and si = 0 if  0 s
*
i ≤ .  
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  Our econometric model can thus be summarized by the screening equations 
(4.1), the application equation (4.3), the investment equation (4.4) and the Tekes 
decision rule (4.5). 
 
 
4.2 Statistical  assumptions,  identification and estimation 
We now explain our statistical assumptions, how identification takes place, and 
how we estimate the model. We drop the i subscript whenever no confusion 
arises. The five unobservables (ωj, ε, η and ν) are assumed uncorrelated with 
observed applicant characteristics. Assuming that η is uncorrelated with ε and ν0 
yields a large reduction in computational cost, as then the Tekes decision rule 
(4.5) is no longer subject to a selection problem and estimation can be broken into 
three steps. Since we cannot reject the Null hypothesis of no correlation between 
ε – ν and η, in estimating the model by ML, we impose 
 
A.6   a)  ν = (1 + ρ)ε + ν0, b) η ⊥ ε, c) η ⊥ ν0, d) ε ⊥ ν0, e) ωj ⊥ ε, f) ωj ⊥ η, 
g) ωj ⊥ ν, h)  ) , 0 ( N ~
2
η σ η , i)  ) , 0 ( N ~
2
ε σ ε , j)  ) , 0 ( N ~
2
0 ν σ ν . 
 
In words, the unobservable η affecting the agency specific utility is uncorrelated 
both with the unobservable ε affecting the marginal profitability of the applicant’s 
investment and with the unobservable ν affecting the application cost. Note that 
the assumptions do not mean that the agency specific utility V is uncorrelated 
with the shock to the marginal profitability of R&D (ε). The agency specific 
utility is given by  ) s 1 /( ) X exp( ) Z ( R ) Z ( V − ε + β η + δ = η + δ =  and thus affected 
by ε. The screening equation unobservables ωj are uncorrelated with all other 
shocks. As A.6a shows, there is no restriction on the correlation between ν and ε. 
A.6h-j are relaxed when we use semi-parametric estimation methods. 
  The first step is the estimation of the ordered probit screening equations (4.1). 
Using the estimates we can calculate the firms’ belief that a submitted application 
gets a particular grade in the two evaluation dimensions. Our assumption that the 
unobservables are normally distributed allows us to identify the coefficients up to 
scale. 
  The second step is to estimate the Tekes decision rule (4.5). It identifies δ, ie 
the effect of observed applicant and project characteristics on the agency specific 
utility. This is enough to identify V( ) since a project generates utility only with 
positive R&D and therefore the constant of the integration of (2.6) is zero. We 
impose (and test) A.6b and A.6c, and estimate (4.5) using a two-limit Tobit model 
without correcting for selection. We also estimate (4.5) non-parametrically by a 
two-limit version of Powell’s (1984) CLAD estimator.  
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  We then calculate an estimate of E(ln(1 – s)) using the estimated screening 
equations and the Tekes decision rule. In step three we then estimate the 
application and investment equations ((4.3) and (4.4)) by replacing E(ln(1 – s)) 
with its estimated counterpart. Estimation is done using both ML and a semi-
parametric variant of the approach suggested by Das, Newey, and Vella (2003, 
henceforth DNV).
23 
  Our data contains information on the proposed R&D investment, not the 
realized one. The model implies that an applicant strictly prefers proposing a 
budget based on a maximum subsidy over proposing any smaller amount, and is 
indifferent between proposing that budget and any larger amount.
24 We estimate β 
on our data by inserting s  into (4.4) and correcting for selection bias using the 
application equation (4.3). 
  The application equation (4.3) allows us to identify how observed applicant 
characteristics affect the fixed costs of application. These costs are crucial for 
welfare analysis and any counterfactual analyses, and they could not be identified 
without a theoretical model. Our theoretical model imposes a form for the error 
term in the application equation and, as a result, we identify the correlation 
between  ν and ε when using ML and assuming normal distributions for the 
shocks. Moreover, we can then identify the variance of the error term in (4.3) 
since following theory the coefficient of the term E(ln(1 – s)) is constrained to 
unity.
25 To calculate the treatment effects and application costs we also estimate 
(4.2) using the semi-nonparametric estimator of Gallant and Nychka (1987) as it 
allows to recover the distribution of shock term (ρε + ν0) in (4.3) without 
imposing a distributional assumption on either ε or ν0. 
  To obtain consistent standard errors in the application and investment 
equations ((4.3) and (4.4)), we bootstrap the whole model (4.1), (4.3)–(4.5) both 
when using ML with normality assumptions and when using the semi-parametric 
DNV estimator. 
  Note also what we cannot identify. In (2.3) we are unable to identify π, the 
applicant’s reservation value. Our cross section estimates are however not 
affected by unobserved differences in the reservation value. Similarly, we cannot 
                                                 
23 Manski (1989) compares merits of the parametric and non-parametric approaches. Manski 
argues that, although the nonparametric approach appears to be more flexible, it involves arbitrary 
exclusion restrictions. Therefore it is not necessarily preferable over the parametric one. 
24 Too see this, recall first that the applicant does not know Tekes’ type (A.1) and the subsidy 
share is bounded above at s . As mentioned in Section 3.1, there is also an euro limit to the ex post 
reimbursements which is based on the proposed budget. Then, since ∂П/∂s > 0  by  (2.3),  the 
applicant wants as high a subsidy as possible. Therefore it proposes an optimal project based on 
the maximum subsidy share, R*(s ). Proposing anything less risks foregoing profits in case where 
the actual subsidy turns out to be larger and the applicant subsequently reoptimizes because of the 
euro limit. On the other hand, the applicant would never want to implement a project larger than 
R*(s ), and it is indifferent between announcing R*(s ) and any larger budget, given the 
assumption that it cannot misappropriate the funds. 
25 This implication of our theoretical model cannot be tested.  
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identify g, the opportunity cost of government funds. We are also unable to 
identify the agency’s screening costs (F–K), which will result in an upward bias in 
the welfare calculations. 
 
 
5 Estimation  results 
We include into all estimation equations firm age, the log of the number of 
employees, sales per employee, a dummy for a parent company, the number of 
previous applications, a dummy indicating if the CEO acts as the chairman of the 
board, board size, and a dummy for exporters. We also include industry and 
region dummies.
26 The SME dummy is only included in the Tekes decision rule 
(4.5) and the application equation (4.3). We include it in (4.3) to allow for the 
possibility that SMEs’ opportunity costs are different eg because of different 
access to other types of subsidies. Inclusion of the SME dummy in the application 
equation and exclusion of it from the R&D equation is sufficient for 
(nonparametric) identification. Our model yields additional identification through 
the expectation term in (4.3). 
  In the reported specifications, we use a slightly different set of explanatory 
variables in the screening equations (4.1) and the Tekes decision rule (4.5) on the 
one hand, and the application and investment equations ((4.3) and (4.4)) on the 
other. For example, we include the squares of the continuous variables in 
application and investment equations ((4.3) and (4.4)).
27 The results from the 
estimation of the screening equations (4.1) are reported in the Appendix. 
  Based on our semi- and non-parametric estimations we find no evidence that 
the distributional assumptions of shocks are driving our parameter estimates. Our 
cross validation results (see Appendix A5) however reject the double normality 
assumptions A.6i,j on the investment and application cost shocks. To explore the 
robustness of our treatment effect estimates we therefore also employ the Gallant 
and Nychka semi-nonparametric estimator when estimating the application 
decision. A detailed description of these robustness checks is presented in the 
Appendix. We have also estimated the model (by ML with normality 
assumptions) by excluding the observations in the 99th size (sales) percentile, 
with essentially identical results to those reported. Other robustness checks will be 
taken up in the context of the appropriate estimation. 
 
                                                 
26 We divide Finland into five regions: Southern, Western, Eastern, Northern and Central Finland. 
Of these, Eastern and Northern Finland are the least developed. We did try interactions between 
firm characteristics and industry and region dummies. 
27 To speed up the computation of the bootstrap we used LR-tests to narrow the set of explanatory 
variables in each equation. The second order terms were excluded from the screening equations 
(4.1) and the Tekes decision rule (4.5) based on the LR-tests.  
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5.1  The Tekes decision rule and agency specific utility 
In Table 5.1 we report the results concerning the Tekes decision rule. The 
coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effects of R&D on agency specific 
utility. We find that the more challenging a project is technically, the higher is its 
subsidy rate. A one point increase on the 5-point Likert scale leads to a 10 
percentage point increase in the subsidy rate. Market risk carries a negative but 
insignificant coefficient. Firm size obtains a positive and significant (at 10% 
level) coefficient. Moving an otherwise identical R&D project into a larger firm 
creates larger positive externalities, eg through higher employee rents. As against 
Tekes’ stated preference that allows a 10 percentage points higher level of 
maximum subsidy for SMEs, it is unsurprising that SMEs are granted a higher 
subsidy, everything else equal: the difference is 8.3 percentage points. The 
corporate governance variables and the number of previous applications have no 
effect. We relegate the industry and regional dummy-results to the Appendix. 
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Table 5.1  Tekes decision rule results 
 
Variable  Dep. var. subsidy-
intensity (all finance) 
Risk -.020* 
  [-.043   .003] 
Technical challenge  .100*** 
  [.076   .124] 
Age -.001 
  [-.003   .002] 
Log employment  .019* 
  [-.001   .039] 
Sales/employment .00005 
  [-.0001   .0002] 
SME .083* 
  [-.003   .169] 
Parent company  .006 
  [-.041   .052] 
# previous applications  -.001 
  [-.007   .004] 
CEO also chairman  .001 
  [-.054   .055] 
Board size  -.007 
  [-.017   .003] 
Exporter -.021 
  [-.079   .038] 
Constant -.054 
  [-.215   .107] 
ση  .190*** 




Linearity 1  0.659 
Linearity 2  0.197 
Sample sel.  .030 
 (.027) 
  Notes: Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence 
interval]. Wald is the p-value of a Wald test of joint significance 
of all RHS variables. All specifications include industry and 
region dummies. 
  Linearity 1 = the p-value of a LR-test of including the proposed 
R&D investment into the equation. 
  Linearity 2 = the p-value of a LR-test of including the proposed 
R&D investment into the equation, plus interactions between it 
and age, log employment, and sales/employee. 
  Sample sel. =  coeff. and (s.e.) of the Mills ratio term when the 
1(apply) specification same as in Table 5.2. 




The above results are obtained under the assumptions A.6b and A.6c, which 
maintain that the error in the Tekes decision rule is uncorrelated with the errors in 
the investment and application equations. To test these assumptions, we first 
estimated a probit application equation
28 and then re-estimated the Tekes decision 
rule by inserting the Mills ratio into it. The Mills ratio obtained imprecisely 
estimated coefficients with values close to zero in all of our several specifications, 
validating our assumptions of no correlation. Recall that this does not imply that 
agency specific utility is independent of profitability shocks, but rather that 
profitability shocks are transmitted to agency specific utility entirely through 
R&D. 
  We also tested our assumption that V( ), the agency specific utility, is linear in 
the applicant’s investment as implied by (2.7). Were V(  ) non-linear in the 
applicant’s investment, the Tekes decision rule would contain an investment term 
(R) or its interactions with observable applicant characteristics. We included these 
and could not reject the Null of (joint) insignificance of them. The agency specific 
utility from a project seem thus to be linear in R&D. 
  In Appendix A4 we report results from estimating the Tekes decision rule 
using CLAD, and an alternative dependent variable. The results are in line with 
those reported here. 
 
 
5.2  Cost of application function 
In Table 5.2 we report the estimates of the application cost function (equation 
(2.8)). Age, CEO being chairman, and parent company status have no statistically 
significant effect, but firm size has a non-linear decreasing effect on application 
costs. Sales per employee increase application costs. One interpretation is that 
firms producing high value added products and services have complicated R&D 
projects based on soft information that are laborious to write down. Another is 
that because the opportunity costs of the effort of making and promoting an 
application are probably far greater than the direct monetary costs of filling in and 
filing it, firms with high value current production have higher opportunity costs of 
applying. The size of the board has a decreasing effect on application costs. This 
may reflect the role of external knowledge in lowering application costs. 
Exporters have lower costs, maybe because they are relatively more experienced 
in dealing with government bureaucracy than non-exporting firms. 
 
                                                 
28 Naturally, the probit was run without the expected subsidy term, but both with and without 
added interactions to improve identification.  
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Table 5.2  Application cost function results 
 
Variable Coefficient 
[95% confidence interval] 
Age .019 
  [-.016   .709] 
Age sq.  -.0001 
  [-.007   .0003] 
Log of employment  -.423** 
  [-10.856   -.043] 
Ln(emp) sq.  .069*** 
  [.022   1.382] 
Sales/employee .002*** 
  [.0007   .022] 
Sales/emp. Sq.  -7.97e-0.8 
  [-8.53e-07   1.76e-06] 
SME .591 
  [-.581   6.939] 
Parent company  -.188 
  [-4.164   .119] 
# Previous applications  -.236*** 
  [-5.383   -.077] 
# Prev appl. sq.  .002*** 
  [.0005   .037] 
CEO is chairman  -.243 
  [-1.575   .388] 
Board size  -.098* 
  [-2.486   .006] 
Exporter -.866*** 
  [-16.604   -.181] 
Constant 13.449*** 
  [11.156   100.589] 
Nobs 10944 
  Notes: Confidence intervals are estimated using a bootstrap with 
400 repetitions. The specification includes industry and regional 
dummies. 
  Wald is the p-value of the joint significance of all explanatory 
variables in the probit 1st stage regression. 
  ***, **, *, and a denote that the whole 99%, 95%, 90% and 85% 
confidence interval has the same sign as the coefficient estimate. 
 
 
The number of past applications has a nonlinear effect, first decreasing and then, 
after 118 applications, increasing application costs. Increasing the number of past 
applications from non-applicants’ median of zero to applicants’ median of two 
decreases application costs by 37%. One prior application decreases costs by 21% 
and four by 60%. It seems that learning by doing is going on. Given that our data 




5.3 Investment  equation 
This equation is often estimated in existing work on R&D subsidies: Our 
investment equation (4.4) identifies the effects of exogenous variables on 
marginal profitability of R&D investment. In view of the received R&D literature, 
it is likely that unobserved heterogeneity accounts for a substantial part of the 
marginal profitability of R&D. This is also what we find, as Table 5.3 shows. 
Firms with higher value-added current production have higher marginal 
profitability of R&D whereas it appears to be lower in firms with CEOs as 
chairmen. Other findings are not robust over specifications (see Appendix A5). 
  The coefficient of  ) s 1 ln( −  is a double test of our specification, though it is 
admittedly weakened by having variation only through firms’ SME status. First, 
the coefficient could measure additionality (as in González, Jaumandreu, and 
Pazó, 2005). In that interpretation, with a point estimate of 0.765 and a wide 
confidence interval, we cannot reject the Null of 1:1 additionality which our 
theoretical model assumes. Second, if one assumes that the effect of R&D on 
profits is modeled using a Box-Cox transformation and that the additionality 
parameter κ equals unity, the test becomes a test of the Box-Cox parameter. The 
interpretation then is that we cannot reject the Null of profits being logarithmic in 
R&D. Both interpretations provide support for our modeling assumptions. 
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Table 5.3  R&D investment function results 
 
Variable Coefficient 
[95% confidence interval] 
Age -.005 
  [-.024   .011] 
Age sq.  .0001 
  [-.0001   .0004] 
Log of employment  -.106 
  [-.259   .069] 
Ln(emp) sq.  .024** 
  [.003   .046] 
Sales/empl. .001** 
  [.0001   .002] 
Sales/emp. sq.  -7.42e-08 
  [-5.59e-07   1.74e-06] 
Parent company  -.023 
  [-.184   .149] 
# Previous applications  -.043** 
  [-.073   -.008] 
# Prev appl. sq.  .0002** 
  [-7.26e-06   .0006] 
CEO is chairman  -.097 
  [-.274   .097] 
Board size  .008 
  [-.028   .050] 
Exporter -.190* 
  [-.383   .043] 
Constant 12.840*** 
  [11.638   13.674] 
Nobs. 914 
Wald (d.f. X)  0.000 
) s 1 ln( −   -0.765 
 (0.780) 
  Notes: Confidence intervals are based on a bootstrap with 400 
repetitions. 
  Wald is the p-value of joint significance of RHS variables. 
  ) s 1 ln( −  coefficient reports the coefficient and the (p-value) of 
a χ
2-test of difference from unity. 
  ***, **, *, and a denote that the whole 99%, 95%, 90% and 85% 




Table 5.4  Covariance structure results 
 
Variable Coefficient 
[95% confidence interval] 
σε  1.212*** 
Standard deviation of the investment equation shock  [1.010   1.351] 
ση  .190*** 
Standard deviation of the Tekes specific utility (= V( )) 
shock  [.173   .206] 
σν0  .791*** 
Standard deviation of the uncorrelated part of the 
application cost function shock  [.234   20.917] 
1+ρ  1.673*** 
Measure of the variance share of ε in ν  [1.174   17.304] 
ρεν  -.718*** 
Correlation between ε and the application equation error 
term 
[-.832   -.462] 
Notes: For all but ση, values are based on a bootstrap with 400 repetitions. For ση, it is 
based on the estimated covariance matrix. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level. 
 
 
5.4 Covariance  structure 
We are able to identify the variances of all error terms, and the covariance 
between the unobservables in the application and investment equations (Table 
5.4). The coefficient determining the variance share of investment shock in the 
application cost shock (assumption A.6a) obtains a value of 1.7. Ceteris paribus, 
the higher the unobserved marginal profitability of the R&D project of a firm, the 
less likely it is that the firm will submit an application. It could be that, similar to 
projects with higher sales per employee, projects with higher marginal 
profitability of R&D are more complicated involving tacit knowledge and are 
therefore more difficult to describe in an application. Or it could be that projects 
with higher marginal profitability of R&D have higher opportunity costs, which 




6 Treatment  effects 
We report medians and means (in parenthesis) of private (firm) and agency 
treatment effects, relegating the details of the calculations into Appendix A7. 
Recall that all treatment effects are ex ante in the sense that they are measured 
prior to the launch of the R&D projects (but after the subsidy decisions).
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Table 6.1  Gross private treatment effects 
 
Distributional assumptions 
underlying estimation and 
integration 
Calculation of shocks  Gross private treatment 
effect on treated, actual 
subsidy 




81 871  Double normal  Integration over ε, ν0  (107 461) 
 49  706 
  Actual ε  (108 902) 
49 706  Double free  Actual ε  (108 902) 
Note: Reported numbers are median and (mean). 
Double normal = both ε and ν0 are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Double free = both shocks’ distributions are determined (semi-)nonparametrically. 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Distribution of the gross private treatment effect 
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29 The results using subsidies expected by the firms prior to the application decision are very 
similar to those reported.  
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In Table 6.1 we report the gross private treatment effects that ignore the costs of 
application. Comparing the first row with other rows shows that ignoring the 
investment shock ε and application cost shock ν0 leads to a large upward bias. By 
conditioning the value of the shocks on the firm being an applicant (by integrating 
them over the relevant regions of the shock distributions), and imposing normality 
on both ε and ν0 greatly reduces the treatment effects (row 2). This is not 
surprising given the finding of Section 5.4 that the applicants have smaller values 
of ε than non-applicants. Rows 2 and 3 reveal that using the estimated value of ε 
instead of integrating over its (imposed) normal distribution further lowers the 
median treatment effects by some 40–45%, but mean treatment effects are close to 
each other. Rows 3 and 4 in turn show that the distributional assumptions make no 
difference for gross private treatment effects when we use the estimated value of 
ε.
30 The median (mean) gross private treatment effect is of the order of 50 000€ 
(100 000€). 
  Figure 6.1 displays the substantial heterogeneity of gross private treatment 
effects on the treated applicants (ie the applicants that received a subsidy), 
calculated under the assumption that both ε and ν0 are normally distributed and 
using the estimated ε. 
 












on treated, actual 
subsidy 
  -121 926  -74 512 
 
No shocks 
(-384 093)  (-385 961) 
Double normal  30 228  43 916 
  Integration over ε, ν0  (42 966)  (64 896) 
  31 496  46 253 
 
Actual ε, integration 
over ρε+ν0  (81 263)  (103 689) 
33 846  49 463 
Double free  Actual ε, integration 
over ρε+ν0  (84 965)  (107 758) 
Note: Reported numbers are median and (mean). 
Double normal = both ε and ν0 are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Double free = both shocks’ distributions are determined (semi-)nonparametrically 
 
 
Table 6.2 presents the net private treatment effects that take into account the costs 
of application. They have been calculated both for all applicants and the treated 
                                                 
30 This is because  β − − + = ε ˆ X ) s 1 ln( ) s ( R ˆ  and irrespective of the estimation method 
ε + β ˆ ˆ X  amounts to the same.  
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ones. The net private treatment effects ignoring shocks are negative contrary to 
what we should observe but are positive once we take into account the shocks. 
Integration over the distributions of ε and ν0 yields clearly lower estimates of the 
mean treatment effect than using the estimated value of ε while the medians are 
relatively close to each other. As we relax the distributional assumptions the 
treatment effects slightly increase. Net private treatment effects are lower than 
gross treatment effects, but not substantially for the most reliable estimates. 
 
Table 6.3  Gross agency specific treatment effects 
 
Distributional assumptions 
underlying estimation and 
integration 
Calculation of shocks  Gross agency specific 
treatment effect, treated, 
actual subsidy 




56 331  Double normal  Integration over ε, ν0  (79 990) 
 33  565 
  Actual ε  (75 720) 
33 565  Double free  Actual ε  (75 720) 
Note: Reported numbers are median and (mean). 
Double normal = both ε and ν0 are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Double free = both shocks’ distributions are determined (semi-)nonparametrically. 
 
 





We then turn to gross agency treatment effects (Table 6.3). If the agency is a 
benevolent social planner, they should reflect the change in R&D spillovers and 
consumer surplus due to the treatment. Agency treatment effects are also  
39 
calculated with and without the shocks. As in the case of gross private treatment 
effects, taking the shocks into account lowers the median treatment effects 
substantially. Using the estimated value of ε again yields lower estimates of the 
treatment effects than integrating over its (assumed) distribution. Comparison of 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 suggests that firms appropriate some 60% of the treatment 
effects. 
  Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of  η + δ ˆ ˆ Z , which is the marginal effect of 
R&D on expected agency specific utility (recall that V  =  (Zδ + η)R). The 
expected agency specific utility is increasing in R&D investments and hence in 
the subsidy rate for the most of the projects in our data. The expected increase in 
agency specific utility is typically between 0.25 and 0.5 per one euro of R&D and 
for 99% of firms, a one euro increase in R&D leads to a less than 0.85 euro 
increase in agency specific utility.
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Table 6.4  Application Costs 
 
Distributional assumptions 
underlying estimation and 
integration 
Calculation of shocks  Application cost, 
applicants 
Double normal  No shocks  242 986 
   (519  012) 
  Integration over ε, ν0  35 533 
   (41  827) 
  Actual ε, integration over ρε+ν0  2 431 
   (4  762) 
Double free  Actual ε, integration over ρε+ν0  503 
   (1  061) 
Note: Reported numbers are median and (mean). 
Double normal = both ε and ν0 are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Double free = both shocks’ distributions are determined (semi-)nonparametrically 
 
 
Table 6.4 reports our estimates of application costs. Ignoring shocks leads to very 
high application cost estimates, explaining the negative net private treatment 
effects. Taking the shocks into account by integrating over the distributions of ε 
and ν0 reduces the estimated application costs by 85%. Using the estimated value 
of the investment shock ε reduces the median application cost by another 33 000€, 
or more than 90%. Relaxing the distributional assumptions further lowers the 
estimate of the median (mean) application cost shock for applicants. It thus 
ultimately seems that for an evaluation of the actual policy, application costs may 
not be of first order importance. Nonetheless, our results from Section 5.4 
suggests that any counterfactual policy analysis will critically depend on 
                                                 
31 We trimmed the sample used in Figure 6.2 at the 99th percentile.  
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application costs since non-applicants have higher investment shocks and 
investment and application cost shocks are positively correlated. 
 






Calculation of shocks  Using the subsidy 
amount predicted 
by the model 
Based on actual 
accepted costs 
Double normal  No shocks  -1.62  -3.42 
  Integration over ε, ν0  0.98 1.45 
  Actual ε, integration 
over ρε+ν0 1.31  1.51 
Double free  Actual ε, integration 
over ρε+ν0  1.34 1.55 
Note: Double normal = both ε and ν0 are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Double free = both shocks’ distributions are determined (semi-)nonparametrically 
 
 
Finally, Table 6.5 shows our calculations of the rate of return on the subsidy 
program.
32 Under the assumption of a benevolent social planner the rate of return 
can be compared to the opportunity cost of public funds (g) to evaluate the 
program.
33 We have used g = 1.2. Figures in Table 6.5 show that once shocks are 
taken into account, the estimated rate of return on the subsidy policy exceeds the 




We analyze one of the mostly widely used innovation policy tools: R&D 
subsidies. We complement the existing literature by building a structural model of 
the R&D subsidy process. Our model generates an R&D equation through firms’ 
first order condition that is close to those estimated in existing work. Our model 
also yields a testable restriction on the key additionality parameter of the 
traditional estimation equation that we cannot reject. We show how selection of 
treatment by the agency and ‘self-rejection’ by the firms – the decision whether to 
                                                 
32 The joint rate of return on the subsidy program is the overall benefits due to subsidies (net 
private treatment effect plus gross agency treatment effect) divided by the overall cost of subsidies 
(granted subsidy share multiplied by the investment given by the granted subsidy), ignoring the 
shadow cost of taxes, and taking all applicants into account. The difference between the two 
columns is that the first one is based on the R&D investment predicted by our model and the 
second one uses the minimum of this and the R&D investment accepted by Tekes. 
33 Kuismanen (2000) estimates the dead-weight loss of existing Finnish taxation to be 15% using 
labor supply models.  
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apply or not – provide information on hitherto unmeasured objects: agency 
specific treatment effects and application costs. 
  Taking the model to project level data from Finland we find that large firms 
produce larger agency specific utility, as do technically more challenging projects. 
Firms with higher value added current production have higher marginal returns to 
R&D and higher application costs. Profitability and application cost shocks are 
positively related, implying that firms do not apply for subsidies for the privately 
most profitable projects.  
  We estimate ex ante treatment effects that reflect the revealed preferences of 
the key decision makers at the time they make their decisions – the firms on 
applying or not, and the agency on the level of subsidy. They thus embody the 
perceived benefits and costs of the program prior to the actual R&D investments 
taking place. We are able to extend the number of identified treatment effects and 
find considerable heterogeneity in all of them. Our estimate of the median net 
private treatment effect on the treated is close to 50 000€ and the median gross 
agency specific treatment is approximately 33 000€. These numbers suggest that 
treated firms internalize 60% of the total treatment effect. 
  To produce a welfare analysis we use strong but standard assumptions. Our 
agency specific treatment effects can be interpreted as externalities and our 
calculated rate of return on subsidies as a social rate of return if one is willing to 
assume that the agency giving subsidies is a benevolent social planner. In that 
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Appendix 
In this Appendix, we report the ordered probit estimation of the Tekes grading 
process (A1); descriptive statistics of a) the whole application sample b) the 
application sample who have strictly positive accepted proposed investments, and 
c) the application sample for which we observe grades in both evaluation 
dimensions (A2); industry and region dummy descriptive statistics (A3); 
robustness checks of the Tekes decision rule (A4) and the investment equation 
(A5); coefficients of the industry and region dummies for the estimated equations 
(A6); details of how we have calculated the treatment effects (A7); and point 
estimates of the application cost function obtained using the semi-nonparametric 
estimator of Gallant and Nychka (1987) in the application equation and DNV-
estimator in the investment equation (A8) 
 
 
A1 The  screening/grading  equations 
We have different applicant samples in the estimations of the two grading 
dimensions, because sometimes we only observe one or the other grade for an 
application. During our observation period, Tekes did not uniformly store grading 
data in their central database, from which our data has been collected. We use the 
estimation results to create the probabilities of getting a particular grade for all the 
10751 (10944) observations in the estimation sample. 
  In the technical challenge estimation, sales per employee, number of previous 
applications, board size, and industry dummies (chemical, industry, electric 
engineering, data processing, and R&D services) increase the probability of 
getting a high grade in evaluation of technical challenge. Having a CEO as 
chairman and being in the food or paper industry decreases the probability of 
getting a high grade. 
  In the market risk estimation, sales per employee and a number of industry 
dummies have a negative effect on the probability of obtaining a high risk rating 
(high meaning higher risk). The industry dummies that carry significant negative 
coefficients are paper, other manufacturing, and telecoms. Being located in 
Western Finland also decreases the probability of being classified as high risk. 
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Table A1  Estimation of the screening equations 
 
Variable Technical  challenge  Risk 
Age .002  -.003 
  [-.008   .012]  [-.015   .009] 
Log employees  -.006  -.047 
  [-.080   .068]  [-.133   .040] 
Sales/employee .001*** -.001* 
  [.0001   .002]  [-.002   .0002] 
Parent company  -.019  -.118 
  [-.223   .185]  [-.357   .120] 
# previous applications  .023*  -.020 
  [-.0001   .046]  [-.047   .006] 
CEO in chairman  -.247**  -.014 
  [-.488   -.007]  [-.296   .268] 
Board size  .080***  .033 
  [.036   .123]  [-.017   .082] 
Exporter .251**  -.319** 
  [.005   .498]  [-.619   -.019] 
Nobs. 582  422 
LogL. -752.711  -527.563 
Joint Significance  0.000  0.0000 
Notes: reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Joint 
Significance is the p-value of a LR test of joint significance of all explanatory 
variables. Both specifications include industry and region dummies. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level. 
 
 
A2  Descriptive statistics of the applicant samples 
Table A2 presents the descriptive statistics for the three samples of applicants 
mentioned above. As can be seen, the differences are minor; judging on 
observables, we are unlikely to have a selection problem among applicants in the 
subsidy equation. The only potentially worrisome difference is that in the smallest 
sample, the mean number of previous application is lower (2.8) than in the other 
two (4.2 and 4.4). The standard error also declines. Also, the proportion of 
telecom firms and firms in Eastern Finland are somewhat lower. As we report in 
the main text, we found no evidence for sample selection after testing it against 
the whole sample. 
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Table A2  Descriptive statistics of different applicant samples 
 




Applicants for whom 
grades in both 
evaluation dimensions 
are observed 
Age 12  12  11 
 (9.6)  (9.5)  (9.0) 
Log employees  3.4  3.5  3.2 
 (1.8)  (1.8)  (1.7) 
Sales/employee 122  126  120 
 (155)  (167)  (128) 
SME .85  .85  .88 
 (.36)  (.36)  (.33) 
Parent company  .51  .53  .48 
 (.50)  (.50)  (.50) 
# previous applications  4.2  4.4  2.8 
 (10.7)  (10.6)  (4.5) 
CEO is chairman  .15  .14  .17 
 (.36)  (.35)  (.38) 
Board size  6.2  6.3  6.1 
 (2.4)  (2.5)  (2.4) 
Exporter .57  .59  .58 
 (.50)  (.49)  (.50) 
Food .04  .04  .03 
 (.18)  (19)  (.18) 
Paper .05  .05  .04 
 (.22)  (.22)  (.19) 
Chemicals .03  .04  .03 
 (.18)  (.18)  (.16) 
Rubber .06  .06  .06 
 (.24)  (.24)  (.24) 
Metals .08  .08  .07 
 (.27)  (.27)  (.25) 
Electric .10  .11  .11 
 (.30)  (.31)  (.31) 
Radio and TV  .04  .04  .05 
 (.20)  (.19)  (.21) 
Other manufacturing  .09  .09  .09 
 (.29)  (.29)  (.28) 
Telecoms .01  .01  .003 
 (.09)  (.10)  (.05) 
Data processing  .21  .20  .26 
 (.41)  (.40)  (.44) 
R&D .15  .15  .13 
 (.36)  (.35)  (.34) 
Western Finland  .32  .32  .35 
 (.47)  (.47)  (.48) 
Eastern Finland  .12  .13  .06 
 (.32)  (.33)  (.23) 
Central Finland / Oulu region  .09  .08  .09 
 (.28)  (.27)  (.28) 
Northern Finland / Lapland  .02  .02  .03 
region (.15)  (.14)  (.17) 




A3  Descriptive statistics of the industry and region 
dummies for the whole sample 
Table A3  Descriptive statistics of the industry and 
      region dummies for the whole sample 
 















Radio and TV  .015 
 (.120) 








Southern Finland  .453 
 (.498) 
Western Finland  .386 
 (.487) 
Eastern Finland  .078 
 (.268) 
Central Finland / Oulu region  .061 
 (.240) 
Northern Finland / Lapland  .023 
 (.149) 




A4  Robustness checks of the Tekes decision rule 
We also estimated the Tekes decision rule by a two-limit version of Powell’s 
(1984) CLAD estimator.
34 As column two of Table A4 shows, the results are 
relatively close to those obtained using Tobit ML. The only noteworthy 
differences are that with CLAD, the rubber industry obtains a significant positive 
coefficient (approximately 0.008 in value, compared with 0.012 for Tobit), and 
the coefficient of Central Finland is no more significant. There are some relatively 
large differences between the insignificant coefficients, though. 
  To test whether measuring the subsidy per cent by summing subsidies, low-
interest loans and capital loans affect the results, we estimated the two-limit Tobit 
using only subsidies, excluding the loans. Column three in Table A4 reveals that 
our results are not driven by our definition of the dependent variable. We also 
checked whether the definition of the dependent variable in the Tekes decision 
rule affects our parameter estimates in the sample selection model (application 
and R&D investment). The R&D investment equations’ parameters are virtually 
identical, as are most of the parameters of the application equation. All parameters 
in the application equation are within one standard deviation of each other. 
 
                                                 
34 The two-limit CLAD was estimated by using the following algorithm: we first estimated a LAD 
using all 379 observations, then excluded all observations with predicted values less than the 
minimum or more than the maximum allowed, and re-estimated the LAD. This was repeated until 
convergence.  
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intensity (all finance) 
(3) 
ML 
Dep. var. subsidy-intensity 
(subsidies only) 
Risk -.020*  -.020  -.024** 
  [-.043   .003]  [-.046   .006]  [-.048   -.00005] 
Technical .100***  .092***  .104*** 
challenge  [.076   .124]  [.065   .119]  [.079   .129] 
Age -.001  -.0001  -.001 
  [-.003   .002]  [-.0017   .0023]  [-.004   .001] 
Log employment  .019*  .025**  .025** 
  [-.001   .039]  [.008   .040]  [.004   .046] 
Sales /   .00005  .00005  .00007 
employment  [-.0001   .0002]  [-.000083   .000151]  [-.0001   .0002] 
SME .083*  .070 .069 
  [-.003   .169]  [-.003   .138]  [-.020   .157] 
Parent company  .006  .015  .008 
  [-.041   .052]  [-.023   .055]  [-.040   .056] 
# previous  -.001  -.002  -.002 
applications  [-.007   .004]  [-.006  .002]  [-.007   .003] 
CEO also  .001  -.018  -.0002 
chairman  [-.054   .055]  [-.064   .028]  [-.057   .056] 
Board size  -.007  -.0003  -.008 
  [-.017   .003]  [-.0084   .0082]  [-.018   .003] 
Exporter -.021 -.016  -.037 
  [-.079   .038]  [-.069   .038]  [-.098   .024] 
Constant -.054 -.083  -.079 
  [-.215   .107]  [-.233   .028]  [-.246   .088] 
ση  .190*** -  .196*** 
  [.173   .206]    [.179   .213] 
Nobs. 379  379 379 
LogL. -19.216  -  -21.542 
Wald 0.000  -  0.000 
Linearity 1  0.659  -  - 
Linearity 2  0.197  -  - 
Sample sel.  .030  -  - 
 (.027)     
Notes: Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Wald is the p-value of a 
Wald test of joint significance of all RHS variables. All specifications include industry and region 
dummies. 
Linearity 1 = the p-value of a LR-test of including the proposed R&D investment into the 
equation. 
Linearity 2 = the p-value of a LR-test of including the proposed R&D investment into the 
equation, plus interactions between it and age, log employment, and sales/employee. 
Sample sel. =  coeff. and (s.e.) of the Mills ratio term when the 1(apply) specification same as in 
Table 5.2. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level. 
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the proportion of expenses that the Agency 
covers, defined as the sum of all three types of financing the Agency grants (in €, see main text) 
divided by accepted proposed investment. In column (3), the dependent variable is the subsidy (in 




A5  Robustness checks of the investment equation 
We estimated the model both by ML, dropping the second order terms, and using 
DNV’s semi-parametric sample selection estimator. We imposed otherwise the 
structure of the ML specification, but allowed the additively separable error terms 
to have an unknown distributions. The results are in line with the main ML 
estimates (reproduced in column 1): most coefficients are within the ML 95% 
confidence intervals. This suggests that our ML distributional assumptions are not 
biasing the parameter estimates. 
  Cross-validation (see Table A5b) suggests that the (double) normality 
assumption does not hold in the data. We used the same trimming and 
transformation DNV. The transformation gives exact sample selection correction 
for Gaussian disturbances. The trimming explains the difference in the sample 
size compared to ML estimations. We tried up to the 4th order terms for the 
variable capturing the effect of subsidies on expected discounted profits in the 1st 
stage, and started from the ML specification. Cross-validation indicated that we 
should include the subsidy-terms up to the 3rd order, but should not include 
interactions of the other explanatory variables. In the 2nd stage, we kept the same 
specification as in ML, and experimented with including up to the 4th order 
transformation of the propensity score (without interactions with explanatory 
variables). We used a Gram-Schmidt ortho-normalization for the 3rd and 4th 
order terms in both stages. 
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Dep. var. proposed 
investment 
Age -.005  -.002  -.013 
  [-.024   .011]  [-.008   .005]  [-.092   .089] 
Age sq.  .0001  -  .0002 
  [-.0001   .0004]    [-.0003   .0008] 
Log of  -.106  .068
a .052 
employment  [-.259   .069]  [-.013   .128]  [-.497   .736] 
Ln(emp) sq.  .024**  -  .003 
  [.003   .046]    [-.047   .034] 
Sales / empl.  .001**  0.001***  .001
a 
  [.0001   .002]  [.0007   .002]  [-.0004   .004] 
Sales / emp. sq.  -7.42e-08  -  -1.73e-07 
  [-5.59e-07   1.74e-06]    [-1.19e-06   1.25e-06] 
Parent company  -.023  -.002  -.015 
  [-.184   .149]  [-.143   .167]  [-.843   .888] 
# previous  -.043**  -.009  -.090 
applications  [-.073   -.008]  [-.019   .004]  [-1.924   1.253] 
# prev appl sq.  .0002**  -  .0006 
  [-7.26e-06   .0006]    [-.011   .015] 
CEO is   -.097  -.100
a -.054
a 
chairman  [-.274   .097]  [-.285   .079]  [-.396   .105] 
Board size  .008  .022  .013 
  [-.028   .050]  [-.020   .058]  [-.402   .439] 
Exporter -.190* -.072  -.061 
  [-.383   .043]  [-.329   .139]  [-2.678   2.236] 
Propensity score  -  -  3.257 
      [-121.150   112.261] 
Propensity     -7.347 
score2      [-127.516   77.826] 
Propensity     31.505 
score3      [-37.036   66.101] 
Constant 12.840***  12.008***  - 
  [11.638   13.674]  [11.115   12.956]   
Nobs. 914  914 876 
Wald (d.f.X)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
ln(1-s ¯) -0.765  -0.108   
 (0.780)  (0.165)   
Notes: Reported numbers are coefficient and [95% confidence interval]. Confidence intervals are 
based on a bootstrap with 400 repetitions. In columns (1)–(3) the dependent variable is the log of 
accepted proposed investment: in column (4) it is the log of proposed investment. 
Wald is the p-value of joint significance of RHS variables. The constant is not identified when 
using DNV. 
ln(1-s ¯) coefficient reports the coefficient and the (p-value) of a χ
2-test of difference from unity.  
***, **, *, and 
a denote that the whole 99%, 95%, 90% and 85% confidence interval has the same 




Table A5b  Cross-validation of the application and R&D 
     investment  equations 
 
Specification  Application equation  R&D investment equation 
Linear term  0.0595  1.0246 
+2nd power  0.0602  1.0227 
+2nd and 3rd power  0.0586  1.0217 
+2nd–4th power  0.0635  1.0234 
+2nd and 3rd powers  0.0982  - 
and 1st order interactions     
between continuous variables     
Notes: the linear term is the effect of expected subsidies on expected discounted profits in 
the application equation, and the propensity score transformation that DNV use (Mills 
ratio) in the R&D investment equation.  The base specification is the same as in the ML 
estimations 
 
Cross-validation figures were calculated using equation (2.22) in Yatchew (1998). 
 
 
A6 Coefficients  of  industry and region dummies 
The only industry dummies with significant coefficients are food (p-value .000) 
and data processing (p-value .081). Using metal manufacturing firms as a 
reference group, firms in the food industry received a substantially higher subsidy, 
of the order of 25 percentage points, whereas data processing firms obtained 
subsidies that were 6.5 percentage points lower. During our observation period, 
Tekes was actively seeking applications from the food industry, which at least 
partially explains the findings concerning the industry. 
  Regional aspects affect Tekes decisions: firms in Eastern and Central Finland 
obtain subsidies that are 7–10 percentage points higher than those in Southern 
Finland. That regional policy matters is, however, debatable, as the city of Oulu, 
which is located in Central Finland is one of the R&D centers in Finland. 
Moreover, we find that firms in the depressed and sparsely populated Northern 
Finland do not get higher subsidies.
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A7  Calculation of treatment effects 
We have calculated the treatment effects in three ways. Below we show the 
calculation of net private treatment effect (NPT) in each of the three ways. All the 
other treatment effects are calculated in similar manner. First, and solely to 
demonstrate the importance of shocks, we ignore them. This gives us 
 
) Y exp( ) s 1 ln( ) X exp( NPT i i i
1
i θ − − β − =  
 
Second, when assuming normal distributions for ε and ν0, we can calculate 
expected treatment effects conditional on applying by integrating over the relevant 
part of the distribution. We thus take into account the fact that for the firms that 
applied, the following condition is satisfied (see equation (4.2)) 
 
[] i 0 i i i i i ) s 1 ln( E ln Y X
i ν + ρε = ε − ν ≥ − − + θ − β  
 
Rearranging we get 
 
[] i i 0 i i i i ) ) s 1 ln( E ln Y X (
1
ε = ν − − − + θ − β
ρ
≤ ε  
 
Using this information about the investment shock, using actual granted subsidies 
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where ƒ( ) and g( ) are the probability density functions of ε and ν0 respectively 
(both assumed to be normal), and F( ) is the cumulative distribution function of ε. 
  Third, we can recover the investment equation shock ε from the investment 
equation (4.3) and insert it both in the firms’ profit function (2.3) and the 
application cost function (2.9) where  ) ( ) 1 ( i 0 i i i 0 i i ν + ρε + ε = ν + ε ρ + = ν . The last 
term in parenthesis is the error term in the application equation (4.2). We then 
integrate over  i i 0 i ) ( ξ = ν + ρε  when calculating the application costs. Only the 
third method is available when we estimate the application equation semi-


















ξ ξ ξ + ε + θ





d ) ( h ) ˆ Y exp(







where  [] ) s 1 ln( ln ˆ Y ˆ X i i i i − − + θ − β = ξ ,  β − − + = ε ˆ X ) s 1 ln( R ln ˆ  and h(  ) is the 
probability density function of ξ (either normal or the estimate provided by 
Gallant-Nychka) and H( ) the corresponding cumulative distribution function. 
 
 
A8  Point estimates of the application equation based on 
semi-parametric estimation 
In producing these estimates, we used the semi-nonparametric estimator of 
Gallant and Nychka (1987) in the application equation and the DNV-estimator in 
the investment equation. The Gallant and Nychka estimation is based on the code 
written by Stewart (2004). Because estimation is very slow we have not calculated 
(via bootstrap) the confidence intervals. The point estimates are within the 
confidence interval of the point estimates produced using the double normal 
assumption and reported in Table 5.2. 
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Table A8  Point estimates of the application cost function 




Age sq.  .00003 
Log of employment  -.099 
Ln(emp) sq.  .026 
Sales / employee  .002 
SME .425 
Parent company  -.089 
# previous applications  -.532 
# prev appl. sq.  .004 
CEO is chairman  -.164 









Radio and TV  .589 
Other manufacturing  .290 
Telecoms .545 
Data processing  -.325 
R&D .213 
Western Finland  .257 
Eastern Finland  -.257 
Central Finland / Oulu region  .096 
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